INTRODUCTION
It's the same old song and dance. It's just been announced that a famous band will be playing in town and tickets go on sale in two weeks. Ticket sale day finally comes, and your computer is on. You are logged into Ticketmaster and the clock strikes 10:00 a.m. Yet, before you can even select your tickets, the entire concert is sold out. This pain may be all too familiar to fans of legendary Canadian rock band The Tragically Hip, who went on a final tour in 2016 after Gord Downie, their lead singer, announced that he had a terminal brain tumour.
1 Two thirds of the available tickets were immediately scooped up by "ticket bots," which are software programs capable of searching for and purchasing enormous numbers of tickets from primary ticket sites like Ticketmaster.
2 Consequently, many fans were forced to resort to purchasing tickets at inflated prices on the secondary ticketing market, using sites such as StubHub or TicketsNow. This is not the first time the secondary ticketing market has presented problems for fans.
In early 2009, Bruce Springsteen and the E Street Band announced their "Working on a Dream" tour in Springsteen's home state of New Jersey.
3 Almost immediately, fans reported experiencing "technical malfunctions" during ticket sales. Some fans were forwarded to Ticketmaster's subsidiary, TicketsNow-a secondary ticketing site-despite seats still being available through Ticketmaster. This error resulted in some fans being forced to pay "prices four Copyright © 2019 by ERIK HOLMSTROM. * Erik Holmstrom would like to especially thank his partner, Stephenie Kirk, for her support. 1 David Common, "'There's a Big Problem': Two-thirds of Tragically Hip Tickets Weren't Sold Directly to Fans" (21 October 2016), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/business/tickets-bots-tragically-hip-marketplace-1.3811658>. 2 Ibid. 3 Daniel Kreps, "Bruce Springsteen 'Furious' At Ticketmaster, Rails Against Live Nation Merger" (4 February times greater than their actual face value."
4 However, once the New Jersey Attorney General announced an investigation into the malfunction, Ticketmaster issued an apology, explaining that the company had "decided to send some buyers to the company's secondary-ticketing company TicketsNow in an attempt to put more tickets into the hands of Bruce Springsteen fans." 5 The company eventually reimbursed fans for the difference between the face value and the cost of secondary tickets.
Additional controversy surrounded the ticketing monolith after a joint undercover investigation by CBC News and the Toronto Star. The investigation uncovered a plot by Ticketmaster to recruit professional scalpers to "cheat its own system" and "squeeze more money out of fans." 6 Ticketmaster's objective was to charge additional fees on resold tickets.
7
After Ticketmaster collected fees from the sale of the initial ticket, the company collected a second fee upon resale. In 2018, the Competition Bureau decided to investigate Ticketmaster and its parent company, Live Nation, after Canada's Economic Development Minister, Navdeep Burns, contacted the bureau's office. 8 The Commissioner of Competition filed an application pursuant to section 74.01 of Canada's Competition Act. 9 The application alleges that, among other things, Live Nation, Ticketmaster, and its subsidiaries have engaged in and continue to engage in deceptive marketing practices stemming from their mandatory fees.
Tickets purchased through Ticketmaster are riddled with fees on top of the ticket's original price. These "service fees," "order processing fees," and "facility charges" only become visible after a customer selects their tickets and provides certain information. These fees add an additional 30 to 40 percent to the ticket cost. This practice is not only frustrating for consumers, but is arguably deceptive. 10 This article seeks to assess the likely outcome of the Competition Bureau's application and considers potential solutions to this problem.
The article begins with a brief explanation of the structure of the live entertainment industry, followed by a description of Live Nation and Ticketmaster's roles therein. The article then analyzes the recent allegations of deceptive practices against Live Nation and Ticketmaster brought forward by the Commissioner of Competition under the Competition Act. The article puts forward potential solutions and concludes that federal legislation must be implemented to curb deceptive practices within the primary market, thereby restricting the use of ticket bots and scalpers.
I. HOW THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IS ORGANIZED
Despite the ease of access to live videos on the Internet and the ability to instantly share live experiences with friends through social networking services, the global concert market has continued to increase in recent years. With a total revenue of US$6.7 billion in 2007, 11 the net proceeds of ticket sales from the primary market alone will reach an anticipated US$24.55 billion by 2021.
12 However, as this industry grows, the number of competitors is beginning to dwindle because of vertical integration. Therefore, it is first necessary to understand how this enormous industry is structured in today's market.
At the forefront of the entire industry are the artists or bands, since they are the commodity desired by the consumer. To reach their audience, these artists or bands hire managers or agents "who represent them and take a share of their earnings in exchange for their managerial services."
13 Through their managers, the performers contract a promoter who organizes the live concerts. The payment structure between bands and promoters has been compared to that between authors and their publishers.
14 This may be best illustrated by an example:
Suppose that the band Angrist's Instruments contracts with Ron's Promotions to perform a single concert. The band receives a "guaranteed advance"; for example, a sum equal to the first $100,000 of ticket sales. Then, before additional revenue is distributed, the promoter, Ron, recovers his expenses and a "guaranteed profit," say $50,000 for expenses and $22,500 for profit. The expenses could include advertising, rent for the venue, the cost of unloading equipment, and so forth. The promoter and the band then split any ticket revenue above the guarantee, plus expenses and minimum profit (above $172,500 in this case), usually with the band receiving 85 percent and the promoter receiving 15 percent of these revenues. This arrangement probably describes around three quarters of contracts. The band's guaranteed advance and percentage of revenue after expenses is higher for bands with greater bargaining power. 14 Meese & Richman, supra note 11 at 6; Krueger, supra note 13 at 4. 15 Krueger, ibid at 4. These contracts impose significant financial risks on the promoter and band, both of whom may suffer when shows are poorly attended. The promoter is also responsible for contracting with a suitable concert venue, which in turn will assist in providing "services such as parking, concessions, sponsorship, and band-related merchandise." 16 The revenue generated is largely determined by the price of concert tickets, which is agreed upon by the promoter and the performers or their manager.
17
Once the ticket price is set, the promoter or venue will hire a ticket distribution company to sell and distribute tickets to customers through its website or other methods, such as "the venue's box office, and, in some cases, directly by the band to its fan club."
18 However, the Internet has made box offices and call centres relatively obsolete. The contracts between the ticket distributor, promoter, and venue outline the "processing fees" that will be charged on top of a ticket's face value, and the revenue generated from these fees is distributed between the distributor and promoter or venue. The number of tickets available for any event is typically determined by the size of the venue. However, many of these tickets are not made available for sale to the general public. Instead, tickets are held back by the promoter, venue, record company and others, such as fan clubs. 20 In 2016, an investigation in New York City by the Attorney General found that over 50 percent of an average show's tickets were set aside, with 16 percent going to "insiders" and another 38 percent being held for presale.
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A multi-year investigation by the Attorney General of New Jersey into Ticketmaster's handling of the 2009 Bruce Springsteen shows in New Jersey determined that "of the 38,778 seats made available for the two shows … only 6,000 people were able to buy tickets for one or more of these seats." 22 The remaining tickets were redirected to secondary sites and an additional 10,494 tickets were set aside for the band, record label, sponsors, and the booking agent. This led 16 Meese & Richman, supra note 11 at 5. 17 Ibid at 7. 18 Krueger, supra note 13 at 4. 19 Meese & Richman, supra note 11 at 8. 20 Ticket sale prices in the primary market are also increasing at a much higher rate than inflation, as measured by the consumer price index (see Figure 2) . As a result, fewer buyers are able to afford tickets. With such a lack of supply, many consumers are forced to purchase through the secondary ticketing market. However, this option does not provide the relief consumers are looking for in price. 
The Secondary Market
The secondary market is, in essence, online ticket scalping. Original ticket purchasers are able to resell their tickets on sites such as StubHub, TicketCity, and TicketsNow. It has been estimated that, as of 2015, the total revenue of the secondary market is around five billion dollars. 25 Because of these secondary market websites, the ability to obtain concert tickets has drastically changed.
A significant reason for this change is the proliferation of ticket bots. Ticket bots have revolutionized the ticket market through their ability to "search and purchase mass quantities of 23 Ibid. 24 Krueger, supra note 13 at page 7. 25 Zack Guzman, "The Surreptitious Rise of the Online Scalper," CNBC (4 March 2015), online: <www.cnbc.com/2015/03/04/online-ticket-resellers-the-surreptitious-rise-of-the-online-scalper.html>. tickets in seconds from ticket vendor websites." 26 Ticketmaster stated in 2013 that sometimes "60 percent of the most desirable tickets for some shows" have been acquired by ticket bots. 27 For example, in 2014, within the first minute of ticket sales, a single scalper used a ticket bot to acquire 1,012 tickets to a U2 concert. 28 While some users see the value in the secondary market as a way to rid themselves of tickets for events they can no longer attend, the secondary market also provides a platform for others to resell tickets at exorbitant prices. Typically, promoters charge "lower than market prices so that the event's tickets may be affordable to ordinary fans." 29 However, ticket scalpers can resell purchased tickets above market prices for events in high demand. 30 Some concert tickets are marked up as much as 72 to 453 percent above face value.
31
Consumers are not the only ones unhappy with the concert ticket system. Many performers, including Elton John, have aligned themselves with concertgoers, calling the secondary market "disgraceful." 32 The Foo Fighters attempted to solve the problem themselves on their "Beat the Bots" tour. Fans could purchase presale tickets at the box office through a lottery-style method. 33 However, fans were soon disappointed to find that ticket scalpers also appeared, eventually selling tickets at marked-up prices.
34
Bruce Springsteen, for his "Springsteen on Broadway" tour, attempted to curb the problem through Ticketmaster's Verified Fan service, which requires fans to sign up and register before tickets go on sale. The service analyzes customers by "looking at their data, including e-mail addresses and past ticket purchases," to try to determine whether they are likely a fan or a scalper. 35 If the customer does not appear to be a scalper, they are allowed better access to tickets through a code. Other artists, such as Taylor Swift, implemented a "boost" program that, based on how much merchandise they purchased, placed fans ahead in the ticket line, which caused some controversy. , online: <www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-carpowich/foo-fighters-ticket-exper_b_6217552.html>. 34 Ibid. 35 Steve Knopper, "Inside Bruce Springsteen and Taylor Swift's War on Scalpers, Ticket Bots," Rolling Stone (11 September 2017), online: <www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/inside-bruce-springsteen-and-taylor-swiftswar-on-scalpers-ticket-bots-201770>. 36 Ibid.
Despite the efforts made by artists, ticket scalping still continues. In fact, instead of attempting to thwart the secondary market, many primary ticket sellers have acquired secondary market businesses, such as Live Nation's purchase of TicketsNow. 37 In effect, these vertical integrations have resulted in Live Nation and Ticketmaster running the entertainment industry.
II. WHO ARE LIVE NATION AND TICKETMASTER?
Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (Live Nation) is a global entertainment company, operating in more than 200 venues. It is currently the world's largest concert promoter. 38 In 2017 alone, it promoted around 30,000 shows and sold roughly 500 million tickets. 39 It is organized and exists under Delaware's laws, but its headquarters are located in Beverly Hills, California.
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Ticketmaster is a business that provides "ticketing services to venues, promoters, sports teams and leagues and to ticketholders who wish to resell their tickets." 41 With over 80 percent of the US market share, Ticketmaster leads the way as the "dominant ticket platform in the primary ticket market."
42 Ticketmaster also has contracts with 80 of the top 100 concert venues. 43 Its revenue is derived from service fees attached to ticket prices. The company also acquired the secondary market ticketing company, TicketsNow, in 2008. This acquisition enabled Ticketmaster to generate over US$900 million from the resale market by 2014. 44 In 2010, Ticketmaster and Live Nation merged to create Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., an entertainment juggernaut. 45 The company now occupies a diverse set of business streams, including promotion, venue management, ticketing, sponsorship, artist management, and other ventures. 46 Critics have found that the merger resulted in little to no change in the industry. Recently, Live Nation faced criticism for using its "control over concert tours to pressure venues into contracting with its subsidiary, Ticketmaster," which, if true, could constitute a violation of American antitrust law. 48 Live Nation and Ticketmaster's grip on the entertainment industryand their ability to act as the major ticket seller, venue operator, promoter, and artist managerenables the companies to charge higher ticket prices and enforce hidden fees, or drip pricing. 49 Drip pricing is a marketing technique in which a business advertises a certain price, only to reveal hidden, mandatory fees later on in the purchasing process. The process is typically found in e-commerce settings, where websites lead consumers through several web pages to complete a single transaction. Drip pricing can be "misleading to consumers because the advertised price is not attainable."
50 While drip pricing is not mentioned anywhere in Canadian law, or in the Competition Act, the Competition Bureau argues that certain sections of the Act are "principle-based prohibitions that apply to a wide array of reviewable matters," including drip pricing. 51 Recently, the Competition Bureau has been particularly active in combatting drip pricing to ensure "truth in advertising in Canada's digital economy." 52 In 2017, the Competition Bureau issued a news release explaining that ticket vendors needed to "review their marketing practices and display the real price of tickets upfront." 53 
III. THE COMPETITION ACT AND FALSE OR MISLEADING ADVERTISING
The Competition Bureau is an independent law enforcement agency governed by the Competition Act that investigates and enforces "price-fixing cartels, anti-competitive mergers and dominant firms that abuse their market power, as well as misleading advertising and other deceptive marketing practices." 54 The Bureau is headed by the Commissioner of Competition, who is responsible for enforcing and administering the Act. 55 Upon application, the Competition Bureau may appear before the Competition Tribunal-a specialized, independent six-member tribunal of federal court judges-to determine whether a business contravenes the Act. 56 The Competition Bureau reviews deceptive marketing practices, such as false or misleading representations. Originally, deceptive marketing practices were not addressed in legislation. However, because of "concerns with fraudulent land sales in western Canada," they 48 Ibid. 49 were implemented in 1914 as criminal offences under the Combines Investigation Act. 57 Later, in 1999, civil remedies were added to address "certain drawbacks of the existing criminal regime of enforcement for misleading advertising and other deceptive trade marketing practices." 58 As a result, the Act was amended to create a "dual track regime."
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A representation made, in any form, that is "false or misleading in a material respect" is subject to the Competition Act.
60 False or misleading advertising is divided into two separate adjudicative regimes under the Competition Act. The criminal regime reviews allegations when there is "clear and compelling evidence that the accused knowingly or recklessly made a false or misleading representation to the public and criminal prosecution is in the public interest." 61 The civil regime, which deals with "reviewable conduct" under Part VII.1 of the Act, titled Deceptive Marketing Practices, includes bait-and-switch selling, misleading ordinary price representations, unauthorized test or testimonial usage, and more. 62 For the purposes of this article, only the civil regime will be discussed.
Section 74.01(1) of the Act states that a person's actions are reviewable by the tribunal when a person engages in conduct for the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the supply or use of a product or any business interest, by any means whatsoever. This includes making "a representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material respect"; making a representation "to the public in the form of a statement, warranty or guarantee of the performance, efficacy or length of life of a product that is not based on an adequate and proper test thereof, the proof of which lies on the person making the representation"; or making a public representation "in a form that purports to be a warranty or guarantee of a product, or a promise to replace, maintain or repair an article or any part thereof or to repeat or continue a service until it has achieved a specified result, if the form of purported warranty or guarantee or promise is materially misleading or if there is no reasonable prospect that it will be carried out." 63 Section 74.03(4) stipulates that, to qualify as reviewable conduct under section 74.01(1), it is not necessary for the Commissioner to establish that any person was actually misled by the impugned representation, that any of the people allegedly misled by the representation were in Canada, or that the public had access to the place where the representation was made. Remedies and penalties for misleading advertising are found in section 74.1(1). (a) not to engage in the conduct or substantially similar reviewable conduct; (b) to publish or otherwise disseminate a notice, in such manner and at such times as the court may specify, to bring to the attention of the class of persons likely to have been reached or affected by the conduct, the name under which the person carries on business and the determination made under this section, including (i) a description of the reviewable conduct, (ii) the time period and geographical area to which the conduct relates, and (iii) a description of the manner in which any representation or advertisement was disseminated, including, where applicable, the name of the publication or other medium employed; (c) to pay an administrative monetary penalty, in any manner that the court specifies, in an amount not exceeding (i) in the case of an individual, $750,000 and, for each subsequent order, $1,000,000, or (ii) in the case of a corporation, $10,000,000 and, for each subsequent order, $15,000,000; and (d) in the case of conduct that is reviewable under paragraph 74.01(1)(a), to pay an amount, not exceeding the total of the amounts paid to the person for the products in respect of which the conduct was engaged in, to be distributed among the persons to whom the products were sold-except wholesalers, retailers or other distributors, to the extent that they have resold or distributed the products-in any manner that the court considers appropriate.
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Based on these fines, if Live Nation and Ticketmaster are found liable, there could be damaging economic consequences for the companies, not only because of the large number of consumers and honest competitors affected, but also because of the time period over which these allegations extend. Therefore, because of the seriousness of the remedy, an analysis of the case against Live Nation should be explored.
IV. DO LIVE NATION AND TICKETMASTER'S DRIP PRICING PRACTICES BREACH THE COMPETITION ACT?
In the beginning of 2018, the Bureau proceeded with an application to review the conduct of Live Nation, Ticketmaster, and its subsidiaries under paragraph 74.01(1)(a) and section 74.05 of the Competition Act. 65 The application alleges that the conduct of these companies constitutes deceptive marketing practices and breaches the Act's misleading advertising provisions.
Paragraph 74.01(1)(a) explains that a person who makes a representation to the public that is false or misleading in a material respect or promotes the supply or use of their productdirectly or indirectly-may have their conduct reviewed. 66 Live Nation and Ticketmaster (and its subsidiaries) made representations to Canadians regarding the online promotion of tickets to sport and entertainment events at a certain price. However, because of additional mandatory fees, the promoted prices were not actually attainable. As the Competition Bureau's application explains, the websites Ticketmaster.ca, ticketweb.ca, and ticketsnow.com present initial tickets for purchase with one price listed under a "Buy on Map" tab. 67 After customers navigate through the purchasing process, mandatory fees are added to the true cost of the tickets. These fees allegedly increase ticket costs by 20 to 65 percent. 68 A countdown clock is also present at times to pressure consumers, through fear of loss, into purchasing tickets. 69 The Competition Bureau noted that on August 21, 2017, the price of a single ticket to a OneRepublic concert increased by $45.80 because of fees.
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At other times, the websites will have the words "+ Fees" next to the ticket prices. 71 However, as the Competition Bureau points out, the true costs of the fees are still unknown to the consumer, despite being allegedly known by the company in advance. 72 This begs the question as to whether or not the companies sporadically and unpredictably change their fees. Therefore, the uncertainty with which these fees are calculated constitutes a misleading representation under s 74.01(a).
An example of this occurred in Vancouver in 2017, as the cost for concert tickets for the band Nickelback was outlined as "$50 + fees" on Ticketmaster's websites for both "Standard Tickets" and "Verified Resale Tickets. 73 However, upon completion of the steps on the website, the price of a pair of standard tickets amounted to $140.60, while the final cost for the resold tickets was merely $117.00. The decision by Ticketmaster to add an increased 40 percent in fees to the standard tickets, but only a 17 percent increase in fees to resale tickets, appears to mislead the customer. 74 These drip pricing tactics appear to be contrary to the Competition Act policies of fair and transparent business practices. Because ticket price is a major deciding factor for consumers, price can be interpreted as a material fact for the purposes of section 74.01(1)(a). In addition, failing to disclose hidden fees or the way fees are calculated could constitute misleading or false representations. Therefore, there is a strong argument that these companies have engaged in reviewable conduct under section 74.01(1)(a).
Section 74.05 explains that a person who advertises a product "for sale or rent in a market and, during the period and in the market to which the advertisement relates, supplies the product at a price that is higher than the price advertised," 78 will be subject to review. This section effectively prevents people from selling their products at prices higher than initially advertised unless one of the four exceptions outlined in the Act are met. 79 As Ticketmaster initially advertised the tickets at a lower price than the final price to be paid once fees were added, this may be classified as reviewable conduct.
V. LIVE NATION AND TICKETMASTER'S RESPONSE
In response to these allegations, Live Nation and Ticketmaster argue that their practices are "transparent, pro-consumer and proper."
80 Their argument centres on the idea that they eventually disclose the fees to the consumer, often through "obvious fee signals," and that, since consumers are aware that the fees will be included later, the representations are not misleading. 81 Furthermore, the companies argue that nothing in the Competition Act explicitly mentions drip pricing and that the Competition Bureau is trying to "apply general provisions of the Act to conduct that they were not intended to cover." 82 With respect to ticket pricing, Ticketmaster explains that their clients set the face value of a ticket; therefore, Ticketmaster retains none of that revenue. 83 Ticketmaster then adds its fees after negotiations with its clients. 84 Some of these fees are retained as revenue by Ticketmaster, but the company explains that other fees are entirely retained by their clients. 85 The purpose of these fees varies. According to Ticketmaster, some fees, such as their "service fees," are charged so that customers can "avoid the need to go in person to a venue box office or retail outlet" and are shared between the clients and company. 86 The amount of fees charged depends on certain factors, such as the client's identity, the venue, the event's jurisdiction, the unit price, and the number of tickets available. 87 78 Competition Act, supra note 9, s 74.05(1). 79 Ibid, s 74.05(2). 80 Competition Tribunal, "Response", supra note 41 at para 1. 81 Ibid at paras 2-3. 82 Ibid at para 4. 83 Ibid at para 20. 84 Ibid at para 21. 85 Ibid at para 22. 86 Ibid at paras 26-27. 87 Ibid at para 23.
In addressing the sequence by which the fees get added to the total cost, Ticketmaster explains that the Competition Bureau has mischaracterized their process. 88 The company uses the term "buy flow" with regard to the "screen-by-screen and button-by-button process used by customers to purchase products." The buy-flow process, Ticketmaster explains, "transparently guides consumers through each element" so that consumers become aware of the price as they reach the final screen. 89 Ticketmaster's position is that the initial price should not be treated as a representation of the final cost, and consumers should not expect it to be so. 90 Buttons like "Buy Tickets," Ticketmaster argues, are traditional e-commerce jargon that do not express a final price. 91 Ticketmaster supports this argument by explaining that the fees added are similar to other online retailers who add shipping costs at the end of a transaction, 92 and, thus, the addition of fees is consistent with e-commerce practices.
Furthermore, Ticketmaster alleges that they remind customers that the initial ticket price will not be the final price during this buy-flow method by using "obvious fee signals."
These "obvious fee signals" include statements explaining that "fees apply to the face value of a ticket and/or that additional fees will be applied at checkout," as well as the description of the ticket's face value as a "subtotal." Ticketmaster also provides customers with links to answer questions about the fees at checkout, appropriately titled "We know no one's a fan of fees/ Learn why they're here." 94 In addition, Ticketmaster states that they have "pop-up" or "shadow boxes" that appear over certain information during this process. 95 Ticketmaster provides an example of these "obvious fee signals" for a Toronto Raptors game (see Figure 5) . A list of available tickets is provided. Upon selecting the tickets, customers are advised next to the cost of the ticket that fees are applicable, 96 then a customer clicks on "GET TICKETS" to obtain the final price (see Figure 5 ).
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In response to the Commissioner's claim that the time limit constraints-emphasized by a clock-force consumers to make expedient decisions, Ticketmaster explains that the clocks are actually pro-consumer tools that "ensure the fair and equitable distribution of tickets to popular events." 98 Since the ticketing industry provides limited product to an endless number of consumers, an "equitable distribution of tickets" must be ensured. 99 Therefore, Ticketmaster's position is that these buy-flow clocks ensure that customers can access available tickets. With regard to the allegation under section 74.05, the respondents argue that the section only applies to advertisements. 102 The companies explain that their initial listed prices are not advertisements but simply displays of prices. 103 In the alternative, Ticketmaster argues that their advertisement is followed by an advertisement correcting the price, an exception under section 74.05(2). In all, Ticketmaster and Live Nation deny that their buy-flow method contravenes the Competition Act.
VI. REBUTTAL AGAINST LIVE NATION AND TICKETMASTER
Live Nation and Ticketmaster's arguments rely on the premise that consumers are not misled by the buy-flow screens because they are constantly reminded of the fees throughout the buy-flow process by "obvious fee signals."
104 Notably, it is not necessary under the Competition Act to prove that any consumer is actually misled, but rather that the representations per se are misleading. 105 The added fees can therefore still be misleading as they are subject to change and are calculated based on a variety of factors. Unlike shipping costs, which are disclosed with the calculated price and are not subject to change, or taxes, which have a fixed, calculable rate, the fees these companies charge are arbitrary and can result in substantially higher prices than anticipated. For these reasons, the representations are misleading despite the buy-flow method.
The arguments of Live Nation and Ticketmaster are construed in a way to show that consumers are not in a rush to purchase tickets. This fails to consider the realities of ticket purchasing. Depending on the popularity of the performer, many concerts will either sell out in seconds, while some may be unlikely to be available again, such as the Tragically Hip's final tour. Ticketmaster's consumers are extraordinarily motivated to obtain tickets to these events. When a consumer goes online, the clock begins to count down and the consumer must act fast to obtain a ticket. The initial price displayed is a significant deciding factor underlying the consumer's choice of ticket. However, once the final cost is displayed, the customer has little choice and no room to negotiate the fees. Restarting the process to find a cheaper ticket poses the risk of finding the concert sold out. Furthermore, consumers do not have time to read Ticketmaster's links, which provide ambiguous explanations of why the fees are present. This reality undermines the argument of transparency with regard to fee practices. If Ticketmaster truly wanted to be transparent, the full ticket price would appear on the first screen. The "obvious fee signals" merely obfuscate the process, which results in fans being surprised later, with little recourse.
The buy-flow system intimidates consumers and either fails to recognize or purposely ignores the commercial realities faced by fans. Buttons like "GET TICKETS" create the "unambiguous general impression for consumers that the [prices] represent the price for tickets" and not merely the initial tickets themselves.
106 A consumer could hypothetically move through the website unaware of the cost of these fees. Therefore, the buy-flow method is a misleading structure that presents an initial enticing price and subsequently forces consumers to make a quick decision about their tickets once the non-optional fees are included. Therefore, the representations may still constitute reviewable conduct under section 74.01(1)(a). In any event, Ticketmaster's conduct is certainly not pro-consumer, especially given their acknowledgment that "no one's a fan of fees."
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While the companies may argue that their disclosure of "+ Fees" on the website exempts them from their obligation to comply with section 74.05 since it could constitute a second advertisement under section 74.05(2)(b), this argument falls short upon further scrutiny. In particular, the distinction made by Live Nation and Ticketmaster hinges on the argument that their price listings do not constitute an advertisement. The distinction that a ticket price posting is not an advertisement demands a very literal understanding of what constitutes an advertisement. With no definition of what an advertisement is under the Act, however, this could be a contested issue.
How these problems will play out is uncertain. Little prior case law has dealt with these buy-flow structures. However, parallels can be drawn between this case and allegations against car rental companies over the last few years. In 2015, the Competition Bureau filed an application against Avis and Budget, arguing that certain non-optional fees, such as the "tire management fee," "energy recovery fee," and "Ont. environ fee" were added to the total cost of car rentals. 108 The hidden fees typically increased the true cost by approximately 35 percent. 109 The Bureau alleged that this conduct was reviewable under sections 74.01(1)(a) and 74.05, explaining that the inclusion of fees constituted reviewable conduct. 110 The issue was settled in 2016. As part of their settlement, Avis and Budget agreed to a $3 million penalty, $250,000 toward the Bureau's costs, and the implementation of a corporate compliance program to promote compliance with the Competition Act. 111 This case shows that the arguments against Ticketmaster and Live Nation may hold. However, as the Avis issue resulted in a settlement, it is difficult to conclude the likelihood of the Competition Bureau's success against Ticketmaster at the tribunal.
Even if Ticketmaster's conduct is determined to be punishable, consideration must be given to the remedy. In 2003, two Americans filed a class-action lawsuit against Ticketmaster under California's Unfair Competition Law. 112 Their claim alleged that Ticketmaster's "description of its fees on its Website … is deceptive and suggested that Ticketmaster's expedited delivery fee ("Delivery Price") and order processing fee ("OPF"), read in the context of the description of other Ticketmaster fees that allegedly were deceptively described too, were the same as or based on expedited delivery and order processing costs." 113 Ten years later, a settlement was reached. The settlement entitled any consumer who purchased tickets between October 1999 and February 2013 from Ticketmaster to between one and seventeen "discount codes worth a $2.25 credit each when applied toward subsequent purchases of primary tickets on the Website for events in the United States." 114 In addition, class members received codes that could be redeemed for two general admission concert tickets at Ticketmaster. However, while Ticketmaster may have lost US$39.6 million from the ticket vouchers, the company was allowed to choose which events and venues were subject to these vouchers, meaning many consumers were unable to redeem their vouchers. 115 If the tribunal implemented a remedy like this, it would be wholly inadequate to fix the current situation. Therefore, notwithstanding the outcome of the Competition Bureau's application, other possible solutions to this problem should be considered.
VII. WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE?
As of December 2018, Ticketmaster has begun to change their ticket advertisements by posting the final ticket price at the beginning of the transaction. As illustrated in Figure 6 , tickets to Ariana Grande's "Sweetener" tour, one of the more popular events in 2019, 116 now show a final price listed, followed by a breakdown of fees in brackets. Whether Ticketmaster has decided to make these changes to avoid a larger monetary penalty pending an unfavourable judgment by the Competition Tribunal is uncertain. However, the change, made barely a year after the Competition Bureau's application, certainly raises questions. Despite these recent changes, Live Nation and Ticketmaster still control an overwhelming portion of the live entertainment industry. Current antitrust and competition laws in both the United States and Canada do not appear to be adequate to curb these practices, and such failures have "hindered competition." 118 Without provincial or federal changes to curb their monopoly, "Ticketmaster has no incentive to lower prices," and consumers will be hindered from making "a meaningful choice in deciding which live event to attend."
119 Therefore, longterm solutions to this issue must be examined.
The lack of regulation in this area has enabled Ticketmaster to not only charge exorbitant service fees, but also to reap benefits in the secondary industry. In the United States, the federal government has attempted to curb these practices in both markets. In 2009, the Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act of 2009 was introduced, and was aimed at protecting consumers "from unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection with primary and secondary ticket sales." 120 However, the bill was stalled after being referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 121 The bill was then reintroduced in 2016, with a goal of forcing primary ticket sellers to disclose the total number of tickets offered, the "distribution method of tickets not available to the general public," the disclosure of all fees, and more. 122 However, the bill once again stalled after being referred to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade.
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In Canada, Quebec is currently the only province with legislation in place to tackle drip pricing through all-inclusive pricing laws. Section 224 of Quebec's Consumer Protection Act states that the "total amount the consumer must pay for the goods and services" must be included in the amount advertised. 124 Ontario is now attempting to follow suit with Bill 190, the quite literally titled What You See is What You Pay Act (Consumer Protection Amendment), 2017. 125 The amendment aims at requiring suppliers to "ensure that any information provided to a consumer regarding the cost of a good or service includes an all-inclusive cost." 126 After the bill's first reading in late 2017, however, no further action has been taken. 127 
VIII. FEDERAL LAWS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED
The discrepancies in pricing laws across different Canadian provinces present problems not only for consumers, but also for companies such as Ticketmaster. A single tour may require Ticketmaster to adhere to different provincial laws, depending on where the concerts are held. While Ticketmaster has acknowledged its adherence to Quebec's inclusive pricing laws, 128 such provincial laws made sense when people purchased their tickets at box offices. Technology and globalization have made the variations between provinces a cumbersome burden. What may be required, instead, is action by the federal government to implement or amend current laws regarding both secondary and primary market practices to provide greater certainty to consumers and to reflect technological advances in today's market.
The concepts of deceptive marketing and pricing regulation are concepts of mixed jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Canada has explained the relationship between the federal Competition Act and provincial consumer protection legislation, first in General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing 129 and more recently in Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, 130 as follows:
While the constitutionality of creating federal laws regarding all-inclusive pricing, drip pricing, and the legality of ticket bots would be the subject of another paper entirely, federal implementation of such laws would be a fairer and more efficient approach. While Ticketmaster argues that its "obvious fee signals" attempt to inform consumers that fees will be included later in their purchase, the total cost of the ticket still does not appear until the final purchasing step. However, once consumers reach the end of their purchasing process, the ticket price may not accurately reflect the initially enticing price. If such tickets were for a popular event, customers would be forced to choose between not going to the event or paying a higher price-leading to an unfair result. Laws enforcing all-inclusive pricing would avoid such a result by allowing consumers to understand the true cost of their tickets, and would allow "secondary purchasers to understand the true cost of the ticket and to accurately compare the prices offered between the primary and secondary sellers." 132 Federal laws would also be a more efficient solution since they would provide greater certainty for ticketing agencies. Companies' websites would only need to follow one set of pricing rules, as opposed to being forced to change their websites for different provinces and territories.
Arguments have also been put forward that the secondary market and ticket scalping are beneficial for the economy since they stimulate competition and make it "easier for consumers to buy tickets to an event in the resale market, as long as they are willing to pay market-driven prices." 133 However, such arguments are unconvincing. Ticket bots are able to acquire enormous amounts of tickets at one time. 134 These bots skew the market as they can "purchase more tickets than a consumer not using the software would be able to purchase," leaving regular fans to purchase tickets at prices far higher than on the primary market. 135 Such a technology does not promote a free market, but uses a technology inaccessible to others to gain an unfair advantage. Therefore, federal legislation banning ticket bots promotes more equal access in the market.
If such laws cannot be implemented, it may be incumbent on the Competition Bureau and the federal government to determine a way to make such problems more prosecutable, either through regulations or tribunal procedure. The implementation of blockchain technology into ticket distribution may also be an option to curb the prevalence of ticket bots. Blockchain is an online distribution ledger that "reconfigures the electronic infrastructure by which tickets are distributed and ticketing transactions are recorded." 136 This technology could then "limit the number of tickets any one consumer may purchase" or stop tickets from being resold after a certain period of time. 137 BitTicket, a current contender in this area, uses blockchain to prevent sales on the secondary market through "anti-fraud sales rules to ensure that no secondary ticket website can hoard tickets" and increase ticket prices. 138 Any attempt to resell the ticket on a secondary website would freeze the seller's BitTicket account, and the purchased tickets would be cancelled. 139 Whether this technology, if widely adopted, would effectively remove the need for the secondary market remains to be seen; however, it would certainly assist in removing the possibility of ticket bots.
Finally, another potential avenue for change is for Parliament to impose disclosure obligations on companies that implement fees. Such disclosure obligations would require information about how the fees are calculated, whether or not they are subject to increase, and the programs used to calculate them. Conversely, disclosure requirements for fees and their calculation processes may result in additional compliance costs for ticket distribution companies. Such costs may then be passed on to consumers, resulting in dissatisfied customers and consequences for smaller businesses attempting to enter the ticketing market, or in other areas where hidden fees provide income. However, what these requirements attempt to promote is consumer protection, which, at the end of the day, may cost money. Therefore, such requirements would come down to conducting a cost-benefit analysis and deciding whether the benefit to the consumer would exceed the cost of small businesses complying. Furthermore, another result might be that the costs of complying with these disclosure obligations would be less than the current costs imposed in an unregulated market. While these strategies may not relieve Live Nation and Ticketmaster of their behemoth status in the entertainment industry, they will certainly enable consumers to make prudent and fair decisions when purchasing tickets.
CONCLUSION
Currently, Ticketmaster and Live Nation are engaging in deceptive marketing practices, and the Competition Bureau's recent application to stop these practices is a step in the right direction. In addition, Live Nation and Ticketmaster's arguments regarding these practices are unconvincing and, ideally, any penalties given by the tribunal will prevent these activities from recurring. If, however, the results of the application prove unfavourable to the Competition Bureau, federal legislation should be implemented to stop these practices in order to allow consumers to make prudent and informed decisions when purchasing tickets.
